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STRICT LIABILITY’S CRIMINOGENIC EFFECT
Paul H Robinson1
It is easy to understand the apparent appeal of strict liability to policymakers and legal
reformers seeking to reduce crime: if the criminal law can do away with its traditional culpability
requirement, it can increase the likelihood of conviction and punishment of those who engage in
prohibited conduct or bring about prohibited harm or evil. And such an increase in punishment
rate can enhance the crime-control effectiveness of a system built upon general deterrence or
incapacitation of the dangerous. Similar arguments support the use of criminal liability for
regulatory offenses. Greater punishment rates suggest greater compliance.
But this analysis fails to appreciate the crime-control costs of strict liability. By explicitly
providing for punishment in the absence of moral blameworthiness, the law undermines its
moral credibility with the community and thereby provokes subversion and resistance instead of
the cooperation and acquiescence it needs for effective crime control. More importantly, the
system's lost moral credibility undermines the law’s ability to harness the powerful forces of
stigmatization, social influence, and internalized norms. Given the serious limitations inherent in
the real-world application of general deterrence and preventive detention programs, the most
effective crime-control strategy is to build the criminal law's reputation for being just, which
means avoiding the use of strict liability.
Essay Headings
Strict Liability Deters Inattentiveness
Application of Strict Liability Is Commonly Limited to Cases of Negligence Per Se
Strict Liability Commonly Results in Only Civil-Like Penalties
Criminalization of Regulatory Violations
Strict Liability and the Criminalization of Regulatory Violations as Undercutting Criminal Law’s Moral
Credibility and Thereby Its Crime-Control Effectiveness
Empirical Evidence That Loss of Moral Credibility Undermines Crime-Control Effectiveness
Empirical Evidence That Use of Strict Liability Undermine Moral Credibility
Conclusion
If one sees the criminal justice system as being in the business of doing justice – giving deserved
punishment in proportion to an offender’s moral blameworthiness – then obviously strict liability is
inappropriate. Such “retributivists” would see criminal law’s culpability requirements as a central
element in assessing moral blame.
But if one is a crime-control utilitarian, strict liability may seem to have its appeal. It can
increase the likelihood of conviction and punishment of those who engage in prohibited conduct or
bring about prohibited harm or evil, thereby increasing the crime-control effectiveness of a system of
general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous. Similar arguments support the use of criminal
liability for regulatory offenses. Greater punishment rates suggest greater compliance.
Setting aside for a moment the increasing evidence that doctrine manipulation to enhance
general-deterrent effect simply does not work in practice,2 and setting aside the increasing evidence
that trying to use the criminal justice system as a means of preventive detention is a self-defeating
1
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program,3 it is argued here that devoted crime-control utilitarian ought to reject strict liability because
its use undermines the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community and thereby provokes
subversion and resistance instead of the cooperation and acquiescence it needs for effective crime
control. More importantly, the system's lost moral credibility undermines the law’s ability to harness
the powerful forces of stigmatization, social influence, and internalized norms. The most effective
crime-control strategy is to build the criminal law's reputation for being just, which means avoiding the
use of strict liability.
The primary arguments in support of strict liability are these: First, the imposition of strict
liability will cause people to be more careful in their conduct and thereby more effectively prevent
criminal risk-taking. Second, the use of strict liability is not really unjust because it is normally limited
to those instances in which there is probably negligence per se. And finally, even if there is some
measure of injustice in its use, the amount is minor, even trivial, because strict liability typically gives
rise to only civil-like penalties.
Strict Liability Deters Inattentiveness
As to the first argument – that the use of strict liability will cause people to be more careful –
let us assume for the sake of argument, as noted above, that this deterrent effect on future conduct
really does exist, that having statutes that impose strict liability actually will translate into people on
the street acting more carefully. What is left unclear is whether strict liability is more effective in this
regard than a standard of culpable negligence would be. The negligence standard requires an actor to
do all that he or she reasonably can be expected to do to be attentive and careful. What can the use of
strict liability add to that? Strict liability might be able to encourage people to be even more careful
than the circumstances reasonably would require. But this seems a questionable goal. Some risks
ought to be taken, and it may be harmful to society to have actors unreasonably preoccupied with all
potential risks.
One might argue that, however, that in a few instances the potential harm is sufficiently serious
that the law ought to do everything within its power to avoid a violation, and strict liability provides
that special “super-punch.” However, the culpable negligence standard already takes into account the
seriousness of the risks, and it already demands greater vigilance to avoid greater risks. As the
potential harm becomes greater, an actor’s ability to avoid negligence liability for his or her
inattentiveness disappears. Further, this special-rule-for-serious-arms argument is inconsistent with
the current use of strict liability, which is most common in minor offenses and less common in more
serious offenses.
Application of Strict Liability Is Commonly Limited to Cases of Negligence Per Se
As to the second argument – that strict liability does not necessarily mean unjust punishment
because its use is typically limited to cases where there is negligence per se – it is true that strict
liability is used sparingly in some modern codes.4 The Model Penal Code reads in a culpability
requirement even to a silent statute,5 with two exceptions: first, culpability’s not read in for
“violations,” which are typically only quasi-criminal offenses, having only a fine, forfeiture, or other civil
penalty,6 and, second, culpability is not read in for offenses defined outside of the criminal code (as
3
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long as there is a clear legislative purpose to impose strict liability).7 Again, offenses outside the code
tend to be of limited seriousness, with only minor penalties attached, or at least this was the situation
when three-quarters of the states codified their criminal law in the 1960s and 1970s.
However, the Model Code’s read-in-culpability rule does not limit the legislature’s ability to
expressly provide for strict liability even for a serious offense defined that is contained within the Code.
For example, the Model Penal Code provides strict liability as to the age of the victim when an offense
punishes sexual conduct with a partner under ten years old.8
But even when strict liability is used in more serious offenses, it is argued, it typically is limited
to instances where an actor is in reality at least negligent.9 For example, it seems unlikely that an actor
would not be at least negligent as to whether a sexual partner is under the age of ten. On the other
hand, it might happen that, “under the circumstances known to [the actor],” a reasonable person “in
the actor’s situation” might well make a mistake as to a sexual partner being under ten years old. And,
in such a case, the Model Penal Code will impose significant liability in the absence of even culpable
negligence. Perhaps more importantly, in the more than half century since the promulgation of the
Model Penal Code, states have shown a portion a tendency to increasingly introduce the use of strict
liability for nontrivial offenses.
Even at the time they adopted a Model-Penal-Code-based codification, many states imposed
strict liability for serious of offenses. For example many adopted felony-murder rules that held the
perpetrator and accomplices liable for any death caused in the course of a felony, without regard to
the absence of culpability as to causing the death. Admittedly, many accomplices will be culpably
negligent as to contributing to such a death; they should have been aware that, by engaging in a felony
where one of them planned to have a gun, for example, a death might result. Yet, under many states
felony-murder rule formulations, murder liability will be imposed even if under the facts of the case no
one could have guessed that there was any chance that anyone could be killed.10
One might argue that we can rely upon the discretion of prosecutors to forego prosecution in
such cases of non-negligence, but others would claim that such an expectation is unrealistic. What is
more important, such an argument concedes that the law itself fails to make the distinctions necessary
for a just result, adopting a position inconsistent with the legality principle, under which law, rather
than prosecutorial discretion, or to define the conditions of criminal punishment.11
The advocates of strict liability that rely upon the negligence per se argument may respond by
pointing to the significant burden placed on prosecutors when they must prove negligence, and may
also cite the dangers to society that may arise if such prosecutions are less successful. Moreover, they
may cite the additional cost of prosecutions if strict liability were not permitted. One response to this
argument, adopted in many countries other than the United States, is to require negligence rather
than permitting strict liability but shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant.12 In other words,
these countries exchange the irrebuttable presumption of negligence embodied in strict liability for a
rebuttable presumption. Unfortunately, by constitutionalizing the requirement that the state must
7
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carry the burden of persuasion on all offense elements, the Supreme Court has foreclosed this reform
option.13
Strict Liability Commonly Results in Only Civil-Like Penalties
Even if the previous arguments in support of strict liability are unpersuasive, it can still be
argued that there is little to be concerned about because strict liability typically results in only civil-like
penalties. The argument finds support in some modern codes, which typically limit the available
penalties when strict liability is imposed. The Model Penal Code provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of existing law and unless a subsequent statute
otherwise provides, when absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element of
an offense defined by a statute other than the Code and a conviction is based upon such
liability, the offense constitutes a violation.14
No term of imprisonment is authorized for a violation.15
There are two difficulties with the minor-penalties argument, however. First, as noted
previously with the example of statutory rape, the Model Code provisions do not altogether bar
serious penalties for strict liability. The Code provision quoted above makes all strict liability provisions
automatically violations only if the offense is “defined by a statute other than the Code.”
Even if strict liability were limited to minor offenses, the minor penalties argument is
problematic. If strict liability is to be justified on the grounds that only minor, civil-like penalties, such
as fines are imposed, one may reasonably ask: Why not just use civil liability? One might counter that
criminal procedures are faster and have other enforcement advantages. But if special procedures are
needed, the legislature has the authority to alter the procedures for civil actions or create special
procedures for this special group of civil violations.
The real reason that the criminal process is preferred here is its potential to impose the stigma
associated with criminal liability, a stigma that civil liability cannot trigger. But this practice creates an
existential problem. Regular use of criminal law’s stigmatization in cases without culpability will have
the effect of diluting and eventually destroying the very stigmatizing effect that is sought. Once people
come to understand that the condemnation of criminal liability is in fact being imposed on blameless
offenders, the connection in their minds between criminal conviction and moral condemnation will be
increasingly weakened – and in all cases, not just those where strict liability has been used somewhere
in the process. And the unfortunate truth is that criminal law’s use of strict liability has increased
enormously over the past decades. The criminal law today is dramatically different from that
immediately following the promulgation of the Model Penal Code in 1962.
Criminalization of Regulatory Violations
One area in which this growth is most dramatic is in the criminalization of regulatory violations.
Governmental regulation has shown an increasing, and disturbing, tendency to criminalize actions
other than those the community would conceive of as morally condemnable conduct. 16 The trend
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toward criminalization has led to an astounding 300,000 or so federal “crimes,” 17 extending
criminalization beyond even the domain of traditional malum prohibitum offenses to criminalize
conduct that is “harmful” only in the sense that it causes inconvenience to bureaucrats. The practice is
not unlike the deterrence-based rules that commonly call for punishments well beyond an offender’s
moral desert for the sake of discouraging what is seen as improper or undesirable conduct. Regulatory
crimes differ, however, in that not only the amount of punishment but the very imposition of criminal
punishment — as opposed to some available civil sanction, such as a fine — seems questionable.
Just as the imposition of criminal liability where a violation is morally blameless will dilute the
moral condemnation of criminal conviction, so too does the imposition of criminal liability upon a mere
regulatory violation. Each time the system seeks to stigmatize where condemnation is not deserved, it
reduces incrementally the system’s ability to stigmatize even in cases where it is deserved, thereby
damaging the very characteristic of criminal law that it attempts to exploit when extending regulatory
sanctions beyond civil liability to include criminal punishment. Such criminal punishment of nonserious
offenses undermines the criminal law’s moral credibility, thereby undermining the crime-control
power that derives from harnessing the powerful forces of social influence.18Thus, any crime-control
advantage gained from using criminal law to punish blameless violations is purchased at a serious cost.
Strict Liability and the Criminalization of Regulatory Violations as Undercutting Criminal Law’s Moral
Credibility and Thereby Its Crime-Control Effectiveness
What is the empirical evidence in support of the claim that moral credibility undermines crimecontrol effectiveness and of the claim that the use of strict liability and the criminalization of regulatory
violations undermines the criminal law’s moral credibility? I have written extensively about these
issues elsewhere but let me sketch here if you highlights.19
Empirical Evidence That Loss of Moral Credibility Undermines Crime-Control Effectiveness
What is the evidence to support the claim that loss of moral credibility undermines the criminal
law’s crime-control effectiveness? History certainly suggests such a dynamic, at least for dramatic
levels of disrespect for the criminal law. The early Soviet criminal justice system was notoriously
arbitrary and corrupt with little or no moral credibility among the general population. Any compliance
it gained was through the coercion of brutality and extensive police power. When those power centers
weakened with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the crime rate increased dramatically. It was only the
coercive influence of the state's threat that had given the system effect, and once that was gone, so
too went its control.
But previous empirical studies have hinted and more recent studies have confirmed that this
same relationship between the criminal justice system's moral credibility and its ability to gain
deference and compliance applies not just to extreme cases but to all – that there is a general
relationship between the system's moral credibility and its ability to gain compliance.20 Even a marginal
decrease in the former will produce a marginal decrease in the latter. This suggests that any system
can improve its ability to gain deference and compliance by improving its reputation for doing justice
and avoiding injustice.
17
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Why should this be so? Why should undermining the criminal law’s moral credibility have the
effect of undermining its crime-control effectiveness? Let me suggest several mechanisms by which
this can occur.
The forces of social influence and internalized norms are potentially enormous. A criminal law
that has earned moral credibility with the people can harness these powerful social and normative
forces through a variety of mechanisms. First, a criminal law with moral credibility can harness the
power of stigmatization. Many people will avoid breaking the law if doing so will stigmatize them and
thereby endanger their personal and social relationships. And the power of stigmatization is cheap – it
does not have the cost of imprisonment, for example – and exists even if the threat of official sanction
is not present – it is enough that friends or acquaintances might learn of the misconduct. A criminal
law that regularly punishes conduct that is seen as blameless or at least not deserving the
condemnation of criminal liability will be unable to harness the power of stigmatization.
Second, a system that has earned moral credibility with the people also can help avoid
vigilantism. People will be less likely to take matters into their own hands if they have confidence that
the system is trying hard to do justice. And, as I detail elsewhere, the danger of vigilantism goes
beyond those rare souls willing to “go into the streets”; it includes “shadow vigilantes” – normally lawabiding citizens and officials who see the system’s failures of justice as justifying their distorting of the
criminal justice process to force justice from a system apparently reluctant to do it.21
Third, a reputation for moral credibility can avoid provoking the kind of resistance and
subversion that we see in criminal justice systems with poor reputations. Such resistance and
subversion can appear among any of the participants in the system. Do victims report offenses? Do
potential witnesses come forward to help police and investigators? Do prosecutors and judges follow
the legal rules, or do they feel free to make up their own? In systems with trial juries, do the jurors
follow their legal instructions or do they make up their own rules? Do offenders acquiesce in their
liability and punishment, or do they focus instead on thinking an injustice has been done to them?
Finally, the most powerful force that comes from a criminal justice system with moral credibility
is its power to shape and reinforce societal norms, and to cause people to internalize those norms. If
the criminal law has earned a reputation for doing justice, then when the law criminalizes some new
form of conduct or makes some conduct a more serious offense than it had previously been, the
community takes this legal action as reliable evidence that the conduct really is more condemnable.22
The forces of social influence and internalized norms are potentially enormous. But if the
criminal law conflicts with people’s judgments of justice, that conflict will undermine law’s moral
credibility and thereby undermine criminal law’s ability to harness these forces.
Let me show the results of just one recent study about this dynamic between the system’s
moral credibility and its ability to gain compliance. Subjects were tested to determine their views on a
variety of issues related to whether they would defer to the demands of the criminal law, or help
investigators, or report an offense, or take criminalization to mean that the conduct really was more
morally condemnable, and so on – setting a baseline for each of the specific mechanisms of potential
influence described above. The subjects were then told of a variety of real-world cases in which the
criminal justice system had done serious injustice or failed to do justice, not by accident but as the
result of legal liability rules formally adopted with the knowledge that they would produce results of
which the community would disapprove. After this disillusioning information, the subjects were tested
again and their views on the measures of deference and compliance had all weakened.

21
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Here are the results.23 (The first column lists not the full text of the questions used but just a
short-hand identification of it.)

The graphic below gives a visual display of this same information. The white bars show the
subjects' responses before the disillusionment, and the black bars after.
8
Time 1

Time 2
7

Agreement

6

5

4

3
1. Life Sentence

23

2. Facebook

3. Financial
Maneuver

4. Arrowhead

5. Hand Gun

6. Dog Lover

IJUD, at 180.
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7. Gas Station

8. Restaurant

This is actually a quite surprising result, if you think about it. When adult subjects are being
tested in a study like this, they come to the study with an already-formed opinion about the moral
reliability of the criminal justice system. There is a limited amount that a researcher can do in the
context of a study to shift that pre-existing view. But despite the fact that we can only marginally shift
subjects' views of the system, we nonetheless see a corresponding shift in the willingness of subjects to
defer to the criminal justice system.
A follow-up study used a different methodology. Instead of the "within-subjects design" used in
the former study, it used a "between-subjects design." That is, instead of asking the same subjects
their views after being "disillusioned" about the criminal justice system, this study used separate
groups. The researchers asked all subjects the same questions but did not disillusion some subjects,
mildly disillusioned other subjects, and more seriously disillusioned a third group. The study found that
the extent of the disillusionment determined the extent to which the subjects would defer to the
criminal justice system.24

Results of between-subjects study
Item

Study 2a baseline Study 2b Low
Study 2b High
No disillusionment disillusionment disillusionment

1. Life sentence means heinous

6.46a

6.59a

5.35b

2. Posting condemnable

6.14a

5.38b

5.59b

3. Financial move condemnable

5.25a

5.16a

4.34b

4. Report arrowhead

5.93a

5.65a

4.95b

5. Turn in hand gun

6.66a

5.40b

4.32c

6. Report dogs violation

5.15a

4.75a,b

4.43b

7. Return to gas station

7.05a

6.63a

5.63b

8. Return to restaurant

7.15a

6.47b

5.84c

Where two cells on a row DO NOT share the same letter, they are statistically different.

Another study did not collect new data but sought to determine whether the same dynamic
was present in some of the large datasets of survey data previously collected by others. As the table
below demonstrates,25 the moral credibility measure in the study explains more of the variance in the
“willingness to defer” measure than any of the other measures. In fact, it is the only predictor that is
statistically significant.
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What the studies show is that there is a continuous relationship between a system's moral
credibility and its ability to gain deference and compliance. A marginal decrease in credibility produces
a marginal decrease in deference and compliance. This is an important conclusion because it gives
every society, no matter how bad its criminal justice system’s reputation, good practical reasons to
improve the moral credibility of its criminal justice system. Even those systems with better reputations
can improve their crime-control effectiveness by further improving their reputation for justness.
To summarize, legal rules that deviate from the community's judgments of justice are not costfree, as has generally been assumed in the past, but rather carry a hidden cost to effective crimecontrol. To be most effective, the criminal law should try to build a reputation as a reliable moral
authority that above all else does justice and avoids injustice. In that way, it can harness the powerful
forces of social and normative influence to gain deference and compliance.
These findings represent an important change to the classic punishment-theory debate, which
has always seen two irreconcilability opposed camps. On one side are the retributivists, who urge
distributing punishment in a way that does justice because they see justice as a value in itself, and
therefore needs no practical justification. On the other side are the utilitarians, who would distribute
punishment so as to avoid future crime. They believe that punishment can only be justified by its
future crime reduction and, therefore, typically urge the distribution of punishment to optimize
general deterrence or the incapacitation of dangerous offenders.
These opposing camps would each propose a distribution of punishment to a different set of
people and in different amounts, because each looks to different criteria. The retributivists, wanting to
do justice, would look to an offender's moral blameworthiness. The utilitarians, who want to reduce
crime, would look to what would most effectively deter and incapacitate potential offenders.
Historically, these two camps have been seen as diametrically opposed and unavoidably in
conflict. The two goals – of doing justice or fighting crime – commonly conflict and, when they do, one
must pick between them. But the empirical desert studies suggest that the picture is actually quite
different. It may be that the best way to fight crime is to do justice.
The superiority of empirical desert as an effective crime control strategy comes in part from the
fact that an empirical desert distribution of liability and punishment necessarily carries with it some
general deterrent effect and some ability to incapacitate dangerous offenders. Thus, the only way in
which those alternative distributive principles can do better than empirical desert is by deviating from
it – that is, by doing injustice or by failing to do justice. But it is exactly these deviations from desert
that undermine the system’s moral credibility and, thereby, its crime-control effectiveness. Thus, any
9

instance of greater deterrent or incapacitation effect purchased by an injustice or a failure of justice
can be offset by the damage it does in reducing the system’s moral credibility. An empirical desert
distribution, on the other hand, can gain the crime-control benefits of moral credibility while
maintaining the general deterrent and incapacitation benefits inherent in such a distribution.
It is important to note, however, that the practical crime-control power of doing justice is found
in distributing criminal liability and punishment according to rules rooted in the community’s
judgments of justice – "empirical desert" – rather than philosophers' notions of justice – "deontological
desert." For it is the effect of empirical desert in building the criminal law's moral credibility with the
community that has the beneficial crime-control effect, and that can be achieved only by having
criminal law track the community's notion of justice, not the philosophers' notion. And empirical desert
is not true justice in a transcendent deontological sense.
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that, as a practical matter, empirical desert is in most
respects a close approximation of deontological desert and, given the practical problems with trying to
produce a criminal law based upon deontological desert, empirical desert may be the best and perhaps
the only practical means of adopting a reliable approximation of deontological desert. 26
Empirical Evidence That Use of Strict Liability Undermine the Moral Credibility
One might conclude that the criminal law’s conflict with the community’s shared judgments of
justice does undermine its crime-control effectiveness, yet also argue that community views are
entirely accepting of the use of strict liability, perhaps for some of the reasons discussed at the
beginning of this essay. Yet the empirical evidence is clear that this is not the case. The use of strict
liability seriously conflicts with community views.
Consider some of the politically popular criminal law doctrines common in the United States:
the use of "strict liability" offenses that do not require that the offender had a culpable state of mind
toward the conduct and circumstances of the offense, the criminalization of regulatory violations, and
the "felony murder rule," which provides that anyone causing a death in the course of felony, even in
the absence of culpability with regard to causing the death, is liable for murder, the most serious form
of homicide, typically reserved for intentional killings.
It may be no surprise that people assume that such criminal law doctrines reflect community
views, given that we are living in a democracy. But that assumption turns out to be wrong. Consider a
recent study that tested laypersons’ judgments of justice on the six illustrative doctrines that included
two strict liability cases, two felony-murder cases, and a criminalization of regulatory violation case.
Subjects were given a dozen “milestone scenarios” that previous testing had shown represented the
full spectrum of relative blameworthiness. These scenarios presented cases from something as trivial
as mistakenly taking another person’s umbrella at a restaurant to intentionally killing another person in
an ambush. Subjects were also given a dozen scenarios, each based on a real-world case, that involve
one of the six crime-control doctrines. Those “crime-control scenarios” are summarized on the table
below.27 The strict liability, regulatory offense, and felony-murder cases are shaded.
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Scenario

Case
Name

Offense

CrimeControl
Doctrine

Actual
Court
Sentence

L. Accidental
teacher
shooting

Brazill

Murder

Adult
Prosecution
of Juveniles

28 years
w/o
parole

K. Drowning
children to save
them from hell

Yates

Murder

Narrowing
Insanity
Defense

life

J. Accomplice
killing during
burglary

Moore

Felony murder,
burglary

Felony
Murder

life at hard
labor w/o
parole

I. Killing officer
believed to be
alien

Clark

Murder

Narrowing
Insanity
Defense

life

H. Cocaine
overdose

Heacock

Felony
Murder

40 years

G. Cocaine in
trunk

Harmelin

Drug
Offense
Penalties

life w/o
parole

F. Air
conditioner
fraud
E. Sex with
female
reasonably
believed
D. Underage sex
overage
by mentally
retarded man
C. Marijuana
unloading

Rummel

Felony murder,
unlawful
distribution of
controlled
Complicity in
substance
unlawful
distribution of
controlled
Petty fraud
substance

Three
Strikes

life w/o
parole

Haas

Statutory rape

Strict
Liability

40 to 60
years

Garnett

Statutory rape

Strict
Liability

5 years

Papa
Almond

Drug
Offense
Penalties
Three
Strikes

8 years

B. Shooting of
TV
A. Incorrect
lobster
container

Blandford

Unlawful
possession of
controlled
Unlawfully
substance
discharging
firearm
Violation of
importation
regulations

Criminalizing
Regulatory
Violations

15 years
w/o
parole
15 years
to life

Subjects were asked to rank order all two dozen cases and to give an appropriate sentence to
each. The results are summarized on the table below.28 The cases of interest to us are again shaded.

28
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Scenario

Subjects'
Mean
between
Sentence

12 Ambush shooting

Court
Actual
Sentence

11 Stabbing

life and
death
essentially

10 Accidental mauling by pit bulls

life
20.6 years

L Accidental teacher shooting (juvenile)

19.2 years

28 years
w/o parole

K Drowning children to save them from hell
(insanity)

26.3 years

life

J Accomplice killing during burglary (felony
murder)

17.7 years

9 Clubbing during robbery

12.0 years

life at hard
labor w/o
parole

8 Attempted robbery at gas station

9.1 years

I Killing officer believed to be alien (insanity)

16.5 years

life

H Cocaine overdose (felony murder)

10.7 years

40 years

7 Stitches after soccer game

5.0 years

6 Slap & bruising at record store

3.9 years

G Cocaine in trunk (drugs)

4.2 years

F Air conditioner fraud (3 strikes)

3.1 years

life w/o
parole
life w/o

5 Microwave from house

2.3 years

parole

E Sex with female reasonably believed overage
(strict liability)

2.9 years

40 to 60
years

4 Clock radio from car

1.9 years

D Underage sex by mentally retarded man
(strict liability)

2.3 years

5 years

C Marijuana unloading (drugs)

1.9 years

8 years

B Shooting of TV (3 strikes)

1.1 years

15 years
w/o parole

3 Whole pies from buffet

8.3 months

A Incorrect lobster container (regulatory)

9.7 months

2 Wolf hallucination

1.1 years

1 Umbrella mistake

1.8 months

15 years to
life

Below is a more graphic presentation of the information on this table.29 The cases on the left of the
graphic are the "milestone" cases, which provide points of comparison along the full length of the
punishment continuum. The lines from each case to the punishment scale show how severely the lay
persons would punish each of these milestone offenses.
29
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On the right are the cases illustrating the six common crime-control doctrines described above.
The solid lines on the right show the amount of punishment that the study's subjects would impose in
each case. The dotted lines show what punishment the law would impose, and did actually impose in
the case. As you see, the law's punishment is dramatically higher than that of the study's subjects. The
difference is even more striking when you take into account that the punishment continuum used here
is exponential. That is moving from ❶ to ❷ triples the punishment (from 2 months to 6 months); just
as moving from ❸ to ❹ triples the punishment (from 1 year to 3 years). Thus, the large difference in
slope between the solid lines and the dotted lines for each case shows that the punishment the law
imposes is commonly many times more severe than what study's subjects would impose.30 The cases
we are interested in our J (Moore), H (Heacock), E (Haas), D (Garnet), and A (Blandford).

How could such a discrepancy occur in a democracy, where the laws are enacted by elected
representatives of the people? The underlying causes of this phenomena are the operation of crime
politics in the United States. First, politicians have been persuaded – often by academics – that they
should focus on crime-control without regard to its effect on deserved punishment. And second,
30

For a discussion of other empirical studies mapping community views on culpability requirements for criminal liability, see IJUD
chapter 14.

13

politicians frequently use criminal law legislation for their own political purposes, rather than to do
justice or prevent crime. Many amendments and new offenses are enacted to show constituents their
concern for some headline issue. One cannot be too critical here. Politicians are simply trying to be
responsive to their community – normally something we see as a good thing, usually a positive feature
of democracy.
But in many instances, “the problem” about which some constituents or the local newspaper
headlines are concerned has little to do with a flaw in an existing criminal law. Not every problem can
be fixed with a criminal code amendment. People will continue to commit outrageous crimes; judges
will continue to make what are seen as sentencing errors, and so on. Yet, legislators often feel a need
to do something to show that they are sensitive to their constituents’ concerns. And there a few
“somethings” that they can do. Changing or adding to the criminal law is one of the few things
available. But when crime legislation is simply a vehicle for expressing concern, drafters have little
reason to assure that their legislation in fact improves rather than degrades criminal law longer-term.
Unfortunately, criminal law bills, even if useless and unnecessary, commonly pass because
legislators share a common reluctance to appear "soft on crime." When a new and unnecessary
offense, say "library theft," is proposed, the issue becomes a referendum on whether legislators care
about public libraries, not on whether the proposed legislation will actually do anything new to combat
the problem of such theft, or on whether it will instead have pernicious ramifications for the
application of the criminal code's general theft provision. A legislator is likely to vote in favor of the
library-theft bill because there is a clear constituency – library users and taxpayers – who would seem
to share a concern about library theft, and no constituency to complain about the new provision's less
obvious and more diffuse drawbacks in creating inconsistencies, ambiguities, and overlaps.
Another sort of systemic problem might be called punishment inflation. In order to emphasize
how seriously the legislators take the new offense they have created, the heat of the moment naturally
pushes the grade of the offense higher than it might otherwise be. A year or two later, when that heat
has died down, the grade may seem out of whack with other offenses, but the exaggerated grade lives
on.
Worse, the dynamic creates a vicious cycle. Having exaggerated the grade of yesterday’s “crime
du jour,” the legislator, in order to adequately express outrage over today’s crime du jour, must exceed
the new, exaggerated baseline established by yesterday’s offense. The ultimate effect is to create an
upward spiral of grading, and a hodge-podge of inconsistent offense grades. There is no fixing this
problem ad hoc. Internal grading consistency within a code requires examining all of its offense and
sub-offense grades at one time, comparing each against the grade of every other. We see this
unhealthy dynamic in every state that we have investigated.31
It is possible to recodify current American criminal codes to better reflect the community’s true
judgments of justice and to better maintain that correspondence in the future. But the larger point
here is that the unjust nature of today’s popular crime-control doctrines is not a product of the
community’s judgments of justice but rather seriously in conflict with them. Those doctrines are more
often than not the product of crime-control strategies such as general deterrence and incapacitation of
the dangerous that ignore community judgments of justice (and have been aided and abetted by many
of the academics who now complain about the injustice of current law resulting from such crimecontrol principles). A criminal law built upon lay people’s judgments of justice would be dramatically
more attentive to tying criminal liability and punishment to an offender’s true blameworthiness. As I
31
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have argued elsewhere, empirical desert, having criminal law rules reflect community shared
judgments of justice – produces the best practical approximation of true justice.32
Conclusion
One might oppose the use of strict liability and the criminalization of regulatory violations on
purely desert grounds. Criminal liability and punishment cannot be justified, under the retributivists’
view, in the absence of moral blameworthiness. And moral blameworthiness requires both the
commission or attempt to commit a condemnable harm or evil and sufficient culpability to be morally
accountable for the conduct.
But even if one rejects the notion that doing justice and avoiding injustice is a value in itself that
requires no further justification, the devoted crime-control utilitarian ought to oppose the use of strict
liability and the criminalization of regulatory violations because such practices undermine the criminal
law’s moral credibility with the community it governs and thereby undermines its crime-control
effectiveness.
As the criminal law’s moral credibility is incrementally reduced, the system is incrementally
more likely to inspire resistance and subversion rather than acquiescence and assistance. Witnesses
are less likely to report crimes and help investigators. Jurors are less likely to follow their legal
instructions and more likely to substitute their own intuitions. Police and prosecutors are less likely to
follow the system’s rules and more likely to morally justified their subversions of those rules. Citizens
are less likely to defer to the criminal law in the grey areas of criminality, and less likely to worry about
a stigmatizing effect from criminal conviction. And most importantly, people are less likely to defer to
and internalize the criminal law’s norms.
Criminal law can harness the powerful forces of stigmatization, social influence, and
internalized norms only if it has established itself as a moral authority. And the use of strict liability and
the criminalization of regulatory violations can only undermine that goal.
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